The 22nd Inf Div, a large part of the armoured
strength of XVIII Corps, was the spearhead unit for Operation Dragonfire. 40 Kloms east of Fort Nuttar is an area of
wadis almost 600 Kloms square, it promised 300 Kloms of hard wadi bed, allowing
72AGs armoured might a swifter journey than one over the dusty, soft prairie.
In the event the rocky sides of the wadis had been well
prepared with crew served weapon emplacements, hidden from aerial surveillance. Veterans of 2/99 Regt of the Separatist PDF bide
their time.
30th Pardus Armoured Regt, nearly 200 Leman Russ,
with their attached Cadian Superheavies and a battalion of Brimlock Dragoons as
their anti-infantry screen, set off just after midnight. Along the hills and ridges the scouting
parties from Sarainian 30th that had been dropped off by Valkyrie,
were quietly and efficiently swept up by the PDF’s Special Forces who were
expecting them.
22 Inf Div were blind, but the clock had been set and Operation
Dragonfire would proceed to timetable.
Gen Pandovic (Narmienia), the Divisional Commander, informed Corps HQ of
the deficiency in reconnaissance and information and was told to proceed regardless.
Delta Company of the 30th Pardus Armoured Regt was allowed to advance to
a point where it could not turn around, indeed,
it could hardly manoeuvre at all. A pinch point in the wadi system limited was
allowed to be passed; keeping some distance between sub units, Delta Company was allowed through the pinch point in its entirety. The interlocking
fields of fire of the Separatist PDF’s Las Cannons and AGTW hit every vehicle
within the first two minutes of the engagement, still an hour before dawn.
Number 7 Platoon of the Brimlock Dragoons did force their way into that
part of the wadi system, however, not being as heavily armoured as Leman Russ’
their Chimerae were also swiftly knocked out.
Delta Company’s Officer Commanding, Major Rotick, had his tank knocked out. Not a soldier who gives up easily, he jumped
to another (working) tank in his company, forcing it’s commander to walk to the
rear.
He directed the fire of the remaining Pardus assets to all fire
on the northern wall, as splitting fire between multiple targets did not appear to
be having any effect at all. In the
event, survivors do report that return fire from the northern positions
slackened off. However the enemy was too
well sited and dug in; after seventeen minutes all of the tanks and Chimerae
were knocked out and the survivors were making their way out of the wadi, back
the way they came, on foot.
A similar story unfolded along all of the chosen lines of
advance that day; there were only a limited number of wadis that would
facilitate an armoured advance and it was no real trouble for the enemy to set
ambushes therein. The lack of reconnaissance
was a major factor. In their haste to
push a greater part of their armoured strength eastwards, they had squandered a
part of it (and more importantly, perhaps, experienced Pardus tank crews
)
in an ill-advised manoeuvre.
An entire Brigade of Rough Riders had landed two days before
. Postponing operation Dragonfire until it
could have become available to Operation Dragoonfire as a reconnaissance asset would have saved resources and
ultimately time.
The wrecked vehicles
had to be recovered, assessed and then either repaired or put beyond use
. Another complication for 22nd Inf Div's planners.
The PDF had already planned their escape routes, largely
using the smaller wadis and occasional prepared tunnels. Any weapons or equipment left behind was
either booby trapped or wrecked. Relatively
few bodies were discovered.
Dismounted infantry from 23rd Inf Div, most notably
the 8th and 9th Vitrian Highland Regiments, deployed into
the ambush sites by mid-afternoon and cleared them, making the are safe for the
vehicle recovery teams.
On day two, vehicle availability was an issue; The 30th
Pardus Armoured Regt was at 54% and the 2nd Brimlock Dragoons were
at 22%. The 3rd Narmienian
took over the lead and moved cautiously, allowing the now largely dismounted
Brimlock Dragoons to keep pace. The wadi
systems opened out, allowing more room for manoeuvre; on day two, 22nd
Div was confronted not just with ambush by dug in and camouflaged crew served
weapons, but also detachments from the PDF’s 73rd Tank Regt.
The PDF tended to use their formations mob handed, allowing
for a greater concentration of force; they were able to do this because they
knew the wadi system well and had hidden tank formations in prepared positions,
as per their planetary defence plan.
They were able on one occasion to charge through the screening
Narmienian tanks and engage one of the Cadian Baneblades at extremely close
range (10s of meters), resulting the destruction of “Cadia’s Wrath” with all
hands.
Tank battles were fought all day. General Pandovic had four tanks shot out from
under him during the day. The first time
his command tank was knocked out, he re-mounted and ordered the survivors from
C and D Companies to assault the dug in positions whilst the rest of his
command kept the PDF tanks away from the fight.
Unfortunately the crew served weapons drew the rest of C and D Companies
in like fly paper and took a heavy toll on the armour, quitting only where the
accompanying infantry caught up.
The Baneblades proved to be a liability in the wadis overall
. They could not use their range or firepower
as their field of fire was extremely restricted. Any attempt to go near the wadi walls would
result in the wall collapsing and the Baneblade eventually bogging in the soft
running sand that inevitably flowed in.
Similarly, neither airpower nor artillery would be used as this was
likely to block the required tank routes with soft sand.
General Pandovic pulled muscles in his back and knees
jumping from the fourth knocked out ‘Russ that day. This mishap would leave him in severe pain for
days, still commanding his Division and the Narmienian 3
rd. Pain and sleep deprivation did not make Day 3
of Operation Dragonfire any better. The
Narmienians availability was at 58% all vehicles.
Colonel
Eatuthor, XVIII Corps COS, Ensured that 1
st Division
took over on Day 3 and that Day 4 would mark a consolidation of gains and
review of progress against the plan.
In the event, the inability of armoured formations to exit
the wadi system once they were in it was deemed sufficient reason to abandon
Operation Dragonfire after 4 days.
